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At the end of a long campaign emphasizing the need for economic growth, 
William Jefferson Clinton was elected to his first term as President in 1992. Throughout 
his campaign, he spoke often of the "primacy of economics in America's domestic and 
foreign policy" (Garten, 1997:25). In fact, he was so occupied by the U.S. economy that 
he saw little need to explain how to best achieve his other goals. From the start of his 
campaign, Clinton spoke passionately of the need for "change" in the way in which the 
United States approached the world. He criticized the Bush Administration for what was 
perceived as its reluctance to support democracy abroad, accusing Bush of wanting to 
preserve the status quo (Melanson, 1996:248). George Bush's seeming passivity in both 
the economic and human rights arenas provided the newly-elected President with the 
perfect opportunity to link these two issues which would quickly become the foundation 
of his foreign policy. Clinton espoused three foreign policy initiatives: restructuring the 
military; elevating the role of economics in international affairs; and promoting 
democracy abroad (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997:398). His administration believed that 
democracy promotion would not only enlarge and strengthen the community of 
democratic nations around the world, but would also lead to an improvement in human 
rights practices throughout the world. This paper examines the President's relative 
success or failure on the latter two initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S TRADE/HUMAN RIGHTS 
LINKAGE 
With the end of the Cold War, the United States embarked on a new adventure in 
foreign policy-making. There was no longer any clearly defined threat, which eliminated 
the need to rely on the containment, the strategy that had dominated policy for 50 years. 
While the policymaking environment during the Cold War was difficult at best, the 
United States had now stepped into a new world defined by its complexity, and the 
challenge was now "to recognize and understand multiple and constantly-shifting sources 
of peril and to address complex and inter-linked causes of unrest" (USAID policy 
statement, 1997). Bill Clinton's initial foreign policy agenda was termed "democratic 
enlargement," a phrase coined by NSC speechwriter Jeremy Rosner. This phrase was 
criticized as being too vague, and was replaced by the phrase "engagement and 
enlargement" by 1994 (Brinkley, 1997: 120). While "enlargement" generally referred to a 
desire to "expand the community of democratic states," this agenda actually served to re-
emphasize the President's commitment to economics as a tool of foreign policy, and was 
in fact designed to achieve his goal of elevating economics in foreign affairs and 
promoting democracy abroad (Brinkley, 1997). As espoused in the document 
Engagement and Enlargement: A National Security Strategy, "The core of our strategy is 
to help democracy and free-markets expand and survive in other places where we have 
the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference" 
(Engagement and Enlargement, 1994). 
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The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Alan Larson, 
when speaking about the "increasing significance of international economic issues on our 
foreign policy agenda," pointed out that "it is America's vocation to lead in the 
establishment of new policies and institutions." Further, "many of the great foreign 
policy challenges of the day - for example, integrating China and Russia peacefully into 
the community of nations - can be achieved only with the creative use of economic 
policies and institutions" (Larson, to National Conference ofEditorial writers, Feb. 
1997). It was clear, however, that economic affairs would take precedence over all else: 
Clinton stated that he wanted "to focus like a laser beam on the economy," and he 
appointed his economic advisers before his foreign policy team (Destler, 1998:89). 
Given the position ofleadership and strength that the United States held within 
the global economy, its role in both trade and democracy promotion would be necessary 
to increase respect for human rights abroad; if the powerful United States could not wield 
its influence to achieve real change in these areas, then it would seem doubtful whether 
democratic values and Western standards of human rights could in fact be exported. This 
sentiment was echoed by the Commerce Department when Secretary Larson declared, "If 
we do not lead, no one else will. We are the only major power with a worldview that 
integrates security and economic concerns. We are the ones needed at the forefront when 
coalitions are formed, when consensus is being sought" (Larson, 1997). If it seems odd 
that the Commerce Department was concerning itself with security and democratization, 
it may seem equally peculiar that the State Department, along with the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) was leading discussions in the OECD about a multilateral 
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agreement on investment (Larson, 1997). For President Clinton, it would seem that 
promoting democracy and free market values throughout the world created an 
"image ... of newly-enfranchised global citizens bustling about drafting legal codes, 
casting votes, and buying stock" (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997:398). The president 
hoped that these newly empowered global citizens would participate in the global 
economy by purchasing U.S. goods, thereby boosting our exports and creating jobs and 
wealth at home. 
Both "democratic enlargement" (the first attempt at designing an agenda) and its 
successor "engagement and enlargement" were comprised of several goals: 1) to 
"strengthen the community of market democracies"; 2) to "foster and consolidate new 
democracies and market economies where possible"; 3) to "counter the aggression and 
support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy"; and 4) to "help democracy and 
market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern" (Brinkley, 
1997:116). Enlargement was basically containment in reverse: instead of fearing the idea 
of communism taking hold in a single country and causing its democratic neighbors to 
topple and fall, enlargement hoped that when one country embraced open market ideals, 
and, hopefully, democratic values, its neighbors would soon follow suit. For example, 
various State Department policy statements note the importance of democracy promotion, 
claiming this strategy is based upon "the belief that the regions spectacular economic 
growth of recent decades provides the basis for a democratic future" (John Shattuck, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Sept. 17, 1997; 
see also Christopher, Oct. 20, 1993). 
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The goals of engagement and enlargement made it apparent that the United States 
no longer considered itself"duty-bound" to undertake democracy and human rights 
promotion throughout the world, but only in countries deemed to be in its own economic 
and strategic interest (Brinkley, 1997). Further reinforcing the importance of economics 
in foreign policy, Anthony Lake, speaking at Harvard University in 1994, gave a speech 
in which he outlined seven reasons that would give the U.S. valid reason to initiate 
military action against another country. These reasons were presented in hierarchical 
order, from most to least important. Of these seven reasons, the third is to defend our 
economic interests. Unfortunately, humanitarian efforts geared toward combating human 
rights abuses is last on the list. This may explain the willingness of the U.S. to send 
troops to stop the genocide in Bosnia that threatened the stability of our allies in Europe, 
but to not involve itself in the crisis in Sudan, which has been far more costly in terms of 
the number of lives lost. In light of this position, it may be accurate to say that Clinton's 
primary goal was to "make the world safe for U.S. business and its global system of 
capital accumulation" (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997:402). The emphasis on economics 
over human rights would be echoed by Samuel Berger (March 27, 1997), and by 
President Clinton himself (February 1996), to the effect of pushing all other aspects of 
foreign policy, with the exception of nuclear disarmament, to the back burner (Ambrose 
and Brinkley, 1997). Even Secretary of State Warren Christopher, when speaking before 
the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives on Oct. 20, 1993, 
stated "We [the State Dept.] are ready to ... ensure that our economic policy is at the heart 
of our foreign policy in this post-Cold War era." Perhaps this is because President 
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Clinton felt more comfortable in the economic arena, with which he was quite familiar, 
over other foreign policy issues, particularly since his forays into other foreign issues 
ended so badly (e.g., Somalia), leading to the resignations ofDefense Secretary Les 
Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher (although Clinton would refuse 
Christopher's resignation). Clinton also believed that the public wanted him to focus on 
the domestic economy, and in fact he felt that he had not been elected to "do" foreign 
policy. In fact, it was this very environment that had sent the President in search of a 
catch-phrase to describe his foreign policy in the first place - he needed to find 
something that Americans could rally behind, much like they had containment. 
In a speech to the Congressional International Economic Issues Forum, Under 
Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs Joan Spero reiterated several of the 
goals President Clinton had set forth earlier: 1) strengthen our own economy; 2) open 
global markets to U.S. goods; 3) coordinate with the G-7 to promote global growth; 4) 
promote sustainable growth in developing nations; and 5) help countries of the former 
USSR build free societies and market economies (1994). Spero has often argued that 
"opening markets, supporting exports, and expanding trade is an integral part of [the] 
broader foreign policy vision that will support traditional foreign policy goals of peace 
and security" (Scott, 1997:60). With the reduced need to rely on military strength as a 
foreign policy tool, even the nation's diplomats were pushing trade issues in their trips 
abroad. Secretary of State Christopher, on this first trip to Japan in April 1993, began his 
discussion with his counterpart in Japan's Foreign Ministry questioning the Minister 
about the lack of access to the Japanese computer market (Spero, 1994). This 
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conversation occurred in spite of the fact that Secretary Christopher wanted nothing to do 
with "engagement and enlargement," which he felt was "a trade policy masquerading as a 
foreign policy" (Brinkley, 1997: 121). 
Within the United States, the condition of the domestic economy was far more 
salient than was the need for U.S. involvement in the world, particularly in light of the 
failure in Somalia. Therefore, in order to address international issues, it became 
necessary for Clinton to design a foreign policy around a way to protect U.S. economic 
and strategic interests while supporting and strengthening the emerging democracies 
throughout the world (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997:406-7). Protecting our interests and 
securing global markets were important since "U.S. growth and prosperity depend on an 
ever-growing export economy" and "trade has grown from about 11 % of U.S. GDP to 
almost 30%" through the period 1971 - 1996 (Scott, i997:37). Clinton thought that the 
prospects for both peace and economic growth depended upon the emergence of a middle 
class from within certain countries that were believed to have the potential for great 
growth. Key to the rise of the middle class was investment by U.S. multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) within these countries, and the purchase of U.S. exports by these 
countries, which will eventually increase domestic competition and create jobs. 
Countries with potentially bright futures would receive virtually all of the attention under 
Clinton's plan, while poor nations would be ignored, potentially widening the gap 
between both rich and poor, and between north and south. In short, Clinton would devote 
attention to the issues of importance to the domestic constituency, which was only 
concerned with the domestic economy. Clinton seemed to be only too happy to take this 
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route, for it served not only to keep the voters happy, but he believed his policy of 
enlargement would be the "key to global leverage" (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997:407). 
In the chapters that follow, I will examine the idea that economic growth is a tool 
through which democracy and human rights can be achieved. Specifically, I will 
examine the impact of growth promotion and the Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) strategy 
on human rights in an attempt to determine whether economic tools alone are adequate to 
achieve improvements in human rights practices in the developing world. The countries 
that were designated Big Emerging Markets will be examined, as will a select group of 
non-BEM countries, in order to determine whether the link between increased trade and 
human rights improvements is valid. I will also make several policy recommendations as 
to additional measures that may actually be more appropriate for improving human rights 
abroad. 
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CHAPTER 2: TRADE EXPANSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ARE OR CAN 
THEY BE LINKED? 
The United States has long been a promoter of human rights (e.g., Smith, 1994). 
However, since the end of the Cold War, economic interests seem to have been propelled 
to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy priorities. This chapter will examine the post-Cold 
War attempt to justify a decreased humanitarian involvement in the world by linking 
human rights to trade policy. Efforts geared toward linking these two issue areas by 
policymakers will be discussed, as will various contributions from the academic 
literature. I will also consider the relativist and universalist views of human rights, and 
will address the legitimacy of both views. 
Increasingly, the emphasis placed on the pursuit of economic growth has 
seemingly allowed human rights to become subordinate to economic goals, possibly as a 
natural consequence of the end of the Cold War and the reduction of threat toward 
Western liberalism. While there have been many efforts designed to promote prosperity 
and stability abroad, including the Marshall Plan, NATO, and others (e.g., Smith, 1994), 
the post-Cold War era has seen both an increase in these attempts and an apparent neglect 
of certain abuses of the citizenry in the countries at which these policies are aimed. The 
Clinton Administration generated policies that reflect this change in orientation, perhaps 
the most notable being the importance placed on the strategy of"engagement and 
enlargement" (e.g., Lake, 1993; Brinkley, 1997). The resulting policies were designed in 
hope of sparking economic growth, but have generally neglected to promote human 
rights in any specific or meaningful way. For example, in a 1997 speech at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Samuel Berger would outline six strategic goals that 
would be pursued by the Clinton Administration in its second term - none of which 
mention directly human rights (Berger, 1997). 
Given the new focus on trade as its primary interest (e.g., see Engagement and 
Enlargement: A National Security Strategy for 1994; see also Lake, 1993), it appears that 
the U.S. may be guilty of sacrificing human rights for economic growth (Neier, 1996). It 
has been suggested that perhaps the promotion of human rights is incompatible with the 
new focus on economic prosperity, as foreign policy is presumed to be dictated by the 
national interest (e.g., Muravchik, 1991), which has shifted over the past decade. 
Regardless of statements by the President and his advisers which point out that U.S. 
national security strategy reflects America's interests and values and emphasizing our 
commitment to freedom, little action is taken to rectify human rights abuses. The 
maintenance by the United States of trade relations with states that are regularly found 
guilty of human rights abuses indicates that economic issues are the new priority of U.S. 
foreign policy, condemning less developed countries to the status quo: " ... So long as the 
rich nations persist in policies which widen the gap between them and the poor nations, 
there is not much hope of an improvement in civil and political rights in poor nations" 
(Macpherson, 1985 :31 ). Thus, the behavior of the United States has important 
implications not only for its own citizens, but for citizens of foreign nations as well. For 
this reason, it is important to determine whether post-Cold War policies have been 
effective in promoting either human rights or economic growth, whether trade promotion 
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truly increases the respect for human rights, and, if not, to develop alternative policies 
designed to achieve this goal. 
Support for the linkage. Rather than a comprehensive human rights agenda, the Clinton 
Administration chose to develop policies in response to events as they occur ( e.g., 
Somalia, Haiti). Not surprisingly, these hit and miss human rights policies often seemed 
incongruent with the post-Cold War economic agenda of trade and democracy promotion, 
which in itself has been viewed as a part of the Administration's limited human rights 
goals: capitalism facilitates democracy and liberalism, which in turn serve to improve 
human rights practices (Fukuyama, 1992; Hirschman, 1986; Schumpeter, 1942). The link 
between economic growth and democracy/human rights has been proposed by numerous 
scholars. In 1959 Seymour Lipset pointed out that" ... the most widespread 
generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that 
democracy is related to the state of economic development" (1959:72). Michael Lewis-
Beck and Ross Burkhart agree, and state " ... it is clear that economic development 
substantially improves a nation's democratic prospects" (1994:907), which they equate 
with liberalism and a heightened respect for human rights. Their study built upon an 
earlier study by Lewis-Beck, Gregory Brunk and Gregory Caldeira that appeared in the 
European Journal of Political Research in 1987, and found that "economic development 
alone accounts for more variance in democracy (their dependent variable) than the other 
independent variables taken together" (1987:468). Burkhart and Lewis-Beck believe that 
"economic development can spread authority and democratic aspirations among a variety 
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of people, thus fostering democracy" (1994:907; see also Dahl, 1989). The effect of 
these new democratic values is a heightened respect for human rights. This occurs 
through the process of interacting with MN Cs, and through the increased awareness of 
international values that comes with this interaction. In addition, there is the desire of 
citizens to have more control both over their paycheck and over the policies and 
legislation that impacts their economic well-being. 
Rejection of the linkage. There are, of course, scholars who disagree with Lipset, 
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, and the others. Gonick and Rosh hold that "economic 
development. .. is not the most important factor affecting the degree to which a political 
system can be characterized as a liberal democracy" (1988: 189, italics added). Joshua 
Muravchik credits Lucian Pye with pointing out that if the relationship between 
economics and democracy were truly clearly defined, then "we [the U.S.] should 
welcome Soviet contributions to economic growth in the undeveloped areas as promoting 
our interests" (1991: 187). He continues, observing that while South Korea and Taiwan 
were able to use economic growth as a springboard for democracy, the Arab nations, 
which are rolling in wealth as a result of their oil exports, democracy has yet to take root 
(1991:187). Accordingly, Muravchik concludes that the link connecting democracy with 
economic development is tenuous. 
Fareed Zakaria has pointed out that democracy often operates for only as long as 
it takes to have an election, after which the winning candidate quickly establishes and 
authoritarian regime that ignores human rights (Zakaria, 1997). Further, the modem 
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concept of democracy embodies free and fair elections, but also the rule oflaw and 
protection of basic freedoms - in other words, constitutional liberalism. While many new 
'democracies' have free and fair elections, many of these states are not pursuing 
constitutional liberalism. This disconnect allows countries to become democratic only in 
the strictest sense of the word, which then fail in bringing about true liberalization that 
results in human rights reforms. If this is the case, then the United States should not base 
its foreign policy upon the premise that economic growth can bring about changes in 
human rights practices. It may be possible that Third World nations may desire human 
rights, but not to the extent that they want other things, like rapid economic growth 
(Macpherson, 1985:22). This has been the case in some of the Pacific Rim countries, 
where civil rights have had to take a back seat to development ( e.g., Singapore, South 
Korea, Hong Kong). 
The Challenge of Human Rights. The United States is unique in the emphasis it places 
on individual liberty and rights. In many nations, particularly in Southeast Asia, the 
collective society holds greater importance, and some view "rampant individualism as a 
Western vice, and at odds with the kind of communitarianism that exists in that part of 
the world" (Garten, 1997:87). This paradox has presented and will continue to present a 
dilemma for the U.S., which views itself as a "human rights model for the world" 
(Garten, 1997:86). Human rights had previously been at least a consideration in U.S. 
foreign policy, and policymakers have condemned countries guilty of the most egregious 
abuses. 
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Within the United States, the human rights tradition stems from the concept of 
natural rights, or natural law. Thomas Hobbes believed that man's "reason," or the law 
of nature, will compel him to give up many of his rights on a contractual relationship 
with the State, while retaining individual liberties related to self-preservation (Hobbes, 
1651). This view holds that man is an autonomous and private being (Henken, 1986:13) 
- a view which likely stems from both the Calvinist work ethic and the Protestant values 
held by the framers of the Constitution. The initial document actually contained few 
guarantees of individual freedom - rights were an afterthought. The Bill of Rights was 
developed to quell fears among the citizens that the new government was entirely too 
powerful, and was not ratified until 1791 (Nathan, 1986:83, Burns, et al., 1993:81). The 
citizens of the newly formed United States had images ofrepressive European 
governments still fresh in their memories, and they wanted their personal liberties 
guaranteed and the powers of government limited. These views were expressed by John 
Stuart Mill, who believed liberty should be defended against both the government and all 
forms of the collective, and that "no society in which individual liberties are not 
respected can be free" (Mill, quoted in Ng, 1995 :60). 
While the United States is a relatively new political entity, other societies, for 
example the Chinese, are ancient, having existed for thousands of years and having 
endured many changes in government (Henken, 1986:20). Both capitalism and socialism 
have been superimposed over a traditional Chinese society, and neither have managed to 
overcome the effects of thousands of years of Chinese tradition. "Confucianism, which 
permeated traditional Chinese society, was basically conservative and establishment-
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oriented," stressing ideals like harmony, moral conduct, and benevolence (Wang, 1995:7; 
see also Edwards, 1986). Andrew Nathan has noted that Chinese political thought in 
regard to law and liberties was shaped by both legalism and Confucianism, both of which 
accept the rulers' right to make law (1986:127). Specifically, legalism held that a ruler 
could make any law necessary to strengthen the state, noting that harsh laws are more 
effective (Nathan, 1986:127). The Confucians believed that laws must comply with the 
moral order inherent in society to be effective, and they state that moral order is created 
by man, not nature, and that the state's authority is not limited by the rights of the 
individual (Nathan, 1986: 127). These attitudes and beliefs toward the rights of the 
individual versus the rights of the state are prevalent not only in China, but throughout 
Asia. Further, they have created a society that sees little need for either formal laws or 
structured governmental institutions (Wang, 1995:8). Individual rights are what the 
government says they are. 
The United States continues to believe that certain human rights are universal, and 
apply to all individuals in all situations. The Bill of Rights, several Constitutional 
Amendments, the rule oflaw, and the fact that the United States is a signatory to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights all seemingly attest to the firm belief in the 
inherent rights that are possessed by all humans. This universalist position holds that 
rights are independent of time, place, culture, ideology, or value system (Lee, 1995:74). 
Critics point out, however, that human rights is a fairly new concept in 
international relations emerging at the beginning of the century with Woodrow Wilson's 
idealism, and then re-emerging in the late 1970s under the human rights-oriented Carter 
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Administration. Until civil rights legislation was signed and the U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam had ended, "the U.S. had too much blood on its hands to seem sincere" in its 
dedication to human rights (Friedman, 1999:73). Women and minorities were 
disenfranchised until the 20th century, blacks were the target of discrimination and abuse 
well into the 1960s, and that the United States has directly and indirectly contributed to 
human rights abuses abroad (see for example Burns, et al, 1994; Scott, 1997; Mahbubani, 
1999; Feng, 1999). It would appear to many- both within the United States and abroad -
that "all men are created equal" is often situational, and that some have clearly been more 
equal than others. This inconsistency in applying human rights standards fuels the fires 
of criticism leveled at the United States by people in the non-Western world who see 
rights as being situational: the cultural relativists. 
The position of cultural relativism is that social actions can only be understood 
and evaluated by reference to the rules, norms, and values of that particular culture (Lee, 
1995 :75). Cultural relativists believe that insisting that rights are universal according to 
Western standards is damaging to people in other cultures. More specifically, Chandra 
Muzaffar states that "Western ideas, values, and traditions are marginalizing other ideas 
about the human being, about human relations, and about societal ties embodied in older 
and richer traditions ... [and] could result in the moral degradation and spiritual 
impoverishment of the human being" (1999:27). The cultural importance traditionally 
placed on human rights in China - as well as in many other societies - dates back 
millennia, and is at least ten times older than the rights which Western scholars and 
statesmen declare to be "universal." Considering " ... how slowly Europe progressed on 
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human rights after the Magna Carta in 1215, the extraordinary rise of human rights 
sentiment in Asia in the last quarter of the 20th century could betoken a great future 
potential for democracy and human rights" (Friedman, 1999:73). 
Perhaps there is one lesson to be drawn from the concept of cultural relativism, 
namely that change in cultural values and norms cannot and should not be forced by 
Western universalists. Changes in norms and values are slow in coming, and take time to 
become embedded within a society. It is very likely that any sudden movement toward 
embracing Western standards of human rights would be fleeting, and that the West would 
do well to be patient. The value shift sought by Western universalists should be 
encouraged, but not forced. Change must occur in the minds of the citizens if they are 
truly to embrace universal standards of human rights. Western standards of human rights 
mean little when they are suddenly given to people who do not value them. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BIG EMERGING MARKETS (BEMs): TESTING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE EXPANSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In an effort to generate new markets for U.S. exports, the Clinton Administration 
began to target certain developing nations believed to have growth potential. This 
chapter will examine the justification behind the Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) strategy, 
as well as efforts to link democratization/human rights to trade policy in these nations. I 
will address the expectations held by Administration officials that these countries' 
economies would expand, boosting U.S. growth rates and creating new jobs for American 
workers, and that integrating these nations into the global economy would bring about 
improvements in their human rights practices. Finally, I will discuss the expected results 
from the BEMs strategy if the Clinton premise is correct, and trade expansion can indeed 
be an effective tool by which to achieve improvements in human rights practices in the 
developing world. 
In an attempt to ensure that open market economies would prosper, and that the 
United States economy would benefit from the new markets that would be created by this 
prosperity, President Clinton and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown decided to pick a 
select group of countries that were believed to possess great potential for growth. All 
these countries are from among the group of developing nations - from which it was 
believed that 75% of the growth in world trade would occur (Scott, 1997:38). It is 
believed that half of this growth will take place from within just ten countries (Scott, 
1997:38). Additionally, it was believed that by the year 2000, these ten countries 
together would comprise a larger market than the European Union. In fact, the BEMs 
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currently purchase more U.S. exports than Europe and Japan combined, and their 
economies are developing quickly (Garten, 1997:14). 
The ten countries that were designated as "Big Emerging Markets" (BEMs) in 
1994 were Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, 
South Korea, and Turkey (Garten, 1997:3). In 1995 the BEMs produced 10.2% of global 
economic output, and by 2015 that percentage will likely double (Garten, 1997:27). It 
was believed that by 2000, the U.S. would be exporting $97 billion of goods to Indonesia, 
$236 billion to South Korea, $36 billion to South Africa, and $79 billion to India (Garten, 
1997:35). The BEMs were considered "gateways to other regional markets" (Scott, 
1997:39). These countries could provide great opportunities for the United States,, 
"expanding markets for our products, higher returns on our investments, and new friends 
in building a more peaceful and prosperous world (Garten, 1997:xxv). (While additional 
countries were added later, the focus here will remain on the initial ten BEMs.) 
These countries are strategically located, and are relatively large in terms of land, 
population, and markets, and have great promise for growth, liberalization, and influence 
over regional trade practices (Scott, 1997:39). These countries play into the Engagement 
and Enlargement agenda of targeting U.S. efforts "to assist states that assist our strategic 
interest ... We must focus our efforts where they have the most leverage. And our efforts 
must be demand driven - they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for 
reform or have already secured it" (Engagement and Enlargement, 1994). These nations 
are "struggling to make the transition from authoritarian state-run economies to 
democratic capitalism;" further, they will "determine the future for their respective 
20 
regions: will they prosper and expand trade and investment, or go back to the status quo" 
( Garten, 1997: 14 )? Jeffrey Garten calls the BEMs "the key swing factor in the future 
growth of world trade, global financial stability, and the transition to free market 
economies in Asia, Central Europe, and Latin America. They are also crucial to nuclear 
nonproliferation, the improvement of human rights, environmental cooperation, and the 
avoidance of war in several critical hotspots" (Garten, 1997:3). In sum, "They are crucial 
players in the world economy. They are gaining political influence in global institutions 
like the World Trade Organization ... They are crucial participants in stemming the spread 
of nuclear weapons and in maintaining peace ... They hold the key to improving human 
rights and labor standards around the globe" (Garten, 1997:xii, italics added). 
The BEMs were believed to be positioned for continued growth. They are 
embracing trade liberalization, dropping trade barriers, and abandoning the pursuit of 
import substitution policies in favor of free trade. The BEMs have all recently begun the 
shift toward open market policies, and have made remarkable progress. For example, the 
Latin American BEMs were dealing with enormous debt, inflation, and capital flight as 
recently as the late 1980s, but through economic policies they have been able to achieve 
growth anyway. The middle class that has emerged within these nations are also seeing a 
glimpse of the political freedom that is possible, and they will likely hold their 
governments accountable for improving the political and social conditions in the years to 
come: freedom, once tasted, is not easily given up. Since the middle class has a great 
deal of purchasing power and thus a great deal of influence, they will be able to press for 
continued reforms. As economic and political changes occur, conditions will become 
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even more favorable for foreign investment, creating even more growth and leading to 
the creation of more jobs, enlarging and strengthening the middle class. 
Involvement by the United States in the global economy, particularly in regard to 
the BEMs, is paramount, because it is in the best interest of the U.S. and its allies to have 
these nations prosper and thrive. Trade promotion is the least costly (and most beneficial 
for the U.S.) means by which to ensure the best possible chance for the continuance of 
democracy and capitalism, and therefore for global stability. The cost to the U.S in this 
relationship with the BEMs will primarily come as a result of the need to import BEM 
products for some time until their export industries grow and stabilize, allowing them the 
time for the emergence of the middle class that desires to buy U.S. consumer goods. This 
will likely create trade deficits for the United States, and may lead to job losses for U.S. 
employees who are displaced when their employers cannot compete with the less 
expensive imports. As Garten points out, however, this competition will actually keep 
prices low and keep inflation down (1997:37). A relationship with the BEMs "will be the 
key to our economic well-being and to our security in the decades ahead" (Garten, 
1997:xxv). It is far less costly to invest in developing economies in order to maintain 
stability than it is to be forced to undertake military or peacekeeping endeavors in order 
to create stability. In the words of President Clinton, "of course, international 
engagement costs money. But the costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war" 
(Clinton, Aug. 1999). Further, it is only logical that the United States would seek to 
partner with nations with similar political and economic energy - in other words, the 
BEMs (Garten, 1997: 19). 
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One of the dilemmas facing the United States is what to do about the human 
rights situation in the BEMs. During the Cold War, the U.S. often made human rights the 
"leading edge of our foreign policy" (Garten, 1997:86). Unfortunately, given the change 
in priorities in this post-Cold War world, it may not be possible to actively promote 
human rights in the same way if it also wants to maintain good trade relations. While the 
BEMs generally support human rights in theory, they place more value on political and 
social order. Labor practices in these countries are often a focus of U.S. attention, as 
child labor, forced labor, and poor working conditions are prevalent in many of the 
BEMs, and are condemned by the U.S. The United States is trying to pressure countries 
to improve labor practices by adding rules governing labor to the World Trade 
Organization charter (Garten, 1997:89). These rules would place tariffs on goods from 
countries found to be in violation of labor laws. Such regulations would certainly require 
support by all the WTO members; this cannot be a unilateral effort, since such attempts 
would be viewed as the U.S. trying to revert to tariffs and embrace protectionism in order 
to combat the influx of cheaper imports. Additionally, any conflict between the U.S. and 
the BEMs may only serve to cause the U.S. to lose precious market share to Europe or 
Japan. Further, some BEMs resent U.S. criticism of their human rights practices in 
general; for example, when the U.S. releases its annual human rights report condemning 
China for its human rights abuses, China protests and has in recent years released its own 
report condemning the United States for what it perceives to be its own abuses. 
A direct approach, whereby the U.S. actively sponsored human rights and 
democratization movements abroad, worked relatively well for the United States 
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throughout the Cold War. The horrific images of the abuses perpetuated on innocent 
peoples by authoritarian regimes were a vivid reminder of everything America was 
fighting hard to eliminate, and served to strengthen the commitment of the U.S. and its 
allies to stand against such regimes. This ideology inspired the United States to develop 
several programs designed to promote democracy; for example, the SEED Act (Support 
for East European Democracy), the Freedom Support Act, and various other USAID 
initiatives. The common fight against the communist threat was a rallying point for 
freedom-loving peoples everywhere. But in the post-Cold War world, the United States 
has chosen to partner with countries that do not respect the values and liberties that are so 
important to liberal democracies. 
In trying to improve human rights standards abroad, the United States has tried 
several methods: Roosevelt wanted to impose human rights by force; Truman relied on 
the Marshall Plan; Wilson wanted the League of Nations to end war and "improve the 
condition of mankind" (Garten, 1997:105). But how does one go about promoting 
human rights and democracy in this new international environment in which we have 
found ourselves? In the absence of a clear threat, with no enemy or competing ideology 
to define "us" from "them," how does the U.S. go about promoting its values? What 
does the future hold for the spread of capitalism, democratic values, and human rights 
now that the United States and Western Europe have evolved from cooperative allies in 
the fight against communism to competing rivals for the largest shares of the world's 
market? It was relatively simple to promote a human rights standard when our military 
allies had the same commitment and values. But now that we have economic partners -
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allies, if you will - who have diverse standards of human rights, it is much more difficult 
to push for other nations to live up to our standards. Even within the United States, it is 
difficult to reconcile the need to promote our values with the need to improve our 
economy. One of the reasons it was so necessary to find a new banner to rally under was 
to rebuild "a foreign policy consensus among internationalists that would withstand a 
countervailing sentiment for returning to American's isolationist roots" (Travis, 
1998 :254-5). It was the quest to reconcile the pursuit of prosperity with a desire to 
maintain a commitment to human rights that would lead to a reliance on trade promotion 
as a tool in President Clinton's foreign policy agenda. 
President Clinton relied on trade and economic growth, acting on the premise that 
interactions with democratic nations, and primarily increased wealth and education would 
lure BEMs into participation in the international economy and eventually into embracing 
a more democratic form of government. As countries become more and more integrated 
into the international community, they become bound by the rules and charters of the 
organizations of which they are members; hence, they become more respectful of human 
rights. As has happened in several of the BEMs, "economic progress loosens political 
control over people's lives" (Garten, 1997: 166). Economic growth brings expectations of 
more opportunities and a better life, and people soon begin holding their governments 
responsible for bringing these things to pass. 
It is important to note that while these ten countries have been singled out for 
"special attention," there are other countries that also show the potential for growth. For 
example, Jeffrey Garten points out that while Russia was considered, it had not 
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proceeded far enough along on the path to economic liberalization; similarly, Greece 
complained that Turkey was included while it was not, but this is simply due to the fact 
that Greece did not have equal "geopolitical significance" (1997:15). Further, while 
previous administrations would have chosen to exclude from this kind of attention certain 
countries that were guilty of egregious human rights abuses, it was during this time when 
human rights were de-linked from trade issues. This would serve to allow the United 
States to negotiate trade policy with the Chinese strictly based on the merits of our 
economic interests, regardless of the nature of human rights abuses within China. The 
U.S. would have to be content with addressing China's human rights problem in forums 
like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. While this was done 
specifically in regard to China, it was clear that human rights would no longer be 
considered when addressing issues of trade. In the case of China, this meant that its 
human rights abuses would no longer serve to deny it most-favored nation (MFN) status. 
This was criticized by many, for if threat of economic sanctions or higher tariffs could no 
longer be used to influence human rights practices, what would take its place? In this 
post-Cold War environment, even the threat of military force is a last resort, and in the 
case of China would likely only serve to escalate tensions between it and the United 
States. By de-linking human rights from MFN, the U.S. may have just tied its own 
hands, rendering itself ineffective in the war against human rights abuses. 
The countries identified as BEMs may be perceived as having had an advantage 
both in pursuing trade with the U.S. and in improving human rights standards - it might 
be argued that these countries must have been moving toward these goals already, for 
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certainly the Clinton Administration would not fill BEM slots with egregious human 
rights violators ( and risk generating the kind of criticism received when he de-linked 
human rights from China's MFN status) or with countries whose economies were in utter 
shambles. Certainly the attention directed at them as a result of the BEM strategy has 
been of some benefit. 
I will also examine several non-BEM countries - countries similar in location, 
ethnicity and experience - of which it would be fair to say also have potential, and some 
of which actually were considered when deciding which countries to target. We will then 
be able to compare BEM versus non-BEM countries, and, hopefully, to determine 
whether any improvements in human rights have occurred while being targeted in the 
BEMs strategy, or if perhaps human rights improvements would best be achieved through 
some other means. Additionally, we should be able to get a more accurate reflection of 
the usefulness of the trade promotion policies, particularly of their impact on human 
rights standards. If the Clinton Administration's premise is valid, I expect that as trade 
and wealth increase in the BEMs, human rights practices will also improve. 
Additionally, given that several of the non-BEM countries were removed from the list of 
potential BEMs based upon their lack of economic or political development, I would 
expect that the purchases of U.S. exports by these countries would remain relatively 
static, as would the human rights practices. In the non-BEM countries, then, there would 
be no clearly defined linkage between economic growth and human rights. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE BEMs: SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In order to judge whether or not increased trade and U.S. investment has been 
beneficial to these countries, it is important to examine the relationship between the rise 
and fall of imports and exports and U.S. investment in relation to standards of human 
rights and quality oflife. In this chapter I will examine the BEM and non-BEM countries, 
as broken into three regions: Latin America, Asia, and "the rest." I will outline the 
economic and human rights indicators within these countries, in order to determine 
whether the linkage between trade and democracy/human rights is valid. Finally, I will 
assess the extent to which expectations for the BEMs and non-BEMs have been realized. 
In assessing the possible linkage between trade and human rights, I have used 
indicators from several sources. Import and export amounts have been provided by the 
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook; U.S. direct foreign investment amounts are 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; human rights measures are taken from the 
Freedom House rankings of political and civil freedoms; and quality of life is measured 
by the Human Development Index (HDI). Freedom House scores political rights and 
civil liberties each on a seven category scale of 1-7, with 1 being the most free and 7 
being the least free. A country is assigned to a particular number category based on 
responses to the checklist and the judgments of the survey team at Freedom House (for 
more detailed information on the scoring categories, as well as an explanation of 
Freedom House's methodology, see Appendix A). The HDI is calculated by using the 
aggregate of several indicators: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, gross primary, 
secondary and tertiary enrollment, and GDP per capita (for additional information 
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regarding how the HDI is calculated, see Appendix B). If the Clinton premise is valid, 
and trade can be used to influence the human rights practices and level of 
democratization within developing nations, then as trade increases, human rights 
practices and quality of life will also improve. For the BEMs, as trade increases, the 
Freedom House and HDI scores will also improve; likewise, if trade flows fall or 
investment flees the country, it is expected that Freedom House and HDI scores will also 
decline. In the non-BEM countries in all three regions, it is expected that both economic 
growth and human rights practices will remain static, or in the event that economic 
growth does occur, that human rights standards may actually decline. 
Latin America. As recently as the late 1980s, many Latin American countries were 
plagued with hyperinflation, debt, and no real economic growth. However, by the early 
1990s, realizing that survival would require competing in the global marketplace, some 
countries began taking measures to control inflation, to pay off or refinance debt, and to 
lure investment. Argentina, for example, made real efforts at stabilizing its currency by 
fixing it to the U.S. dollar, privatizing state-owned industries and resources, and 
controlling inflation. Brazil undertook similar measures, and was able to bring a 1993 
inflation rate of 2500% down to below 15% in the following year. Brazil is attractive to 
foreign investors because it has a highly advanced technological base, and as the largest 
country in South America it accounts for 25% of all imports from around the world into 
Latin America. Both Brazil and Argentina are members of MERCOSUR, and have a 
great deal of influence in Latin America, as well as with the United States. Of somewhat 
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greater importance to the U.S. - at least strategically - is Mexico. Sharing a border with 
the U.S., it also shares concerns about migration, drug policy, investment, and trade. 
Mexico was the first developing nation to join the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and is a partner with the U.S. and Canada in NAFTA. 
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Figure 1: US Exports to Latin America 
The BEMs strategy has had a relatively positive impact on the economies of 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Per capita incomes have risen substantially - by 1999 
they have at least doubled their 1990 level. The primary goal of the Clinton 
Administration - to increase U.S. exports - has been achieved at stunning levels (see 
Figure 1). U.S. exports to Argentina have increased from $1.2 billion in 1990 to $5.1 
billion in 1999; similarly, Brazil has increased its consumption of U.S. goods by 200%, 
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and Mexico, which purchased $28 billion in U.S. exports in 1990, purchased $109.5 
billion in 1999. (While these numbers seem impressive, it should be noted that the 
United States runs a trade deficit with Mexico, which in 1999 was approximately $11 
billion.) U.S. direct investment within these countries has also risen. 
The targeting of these countries has had a positive effect for the United States as 
well as for the economies of the Latin American BEMs. To put this impact into some 
perspective, it is helpful to also examine the economies of several non-BEM Latin 
American countries. 
When Ron Brown and his Commerce Department colleagues were selecting 
countries that would qualify as Latin American BEMs, they considered Venezuela, 
eventually discarding it when it was realized that "Caracas's policies were in a total 
shambles, with little prospect, in our view at the time, that they would improve" (Garten, 
1997:15). This seems, at least to a certain extent, to have been a good idea: the 
Venezuelan banking system collapsed in 1994, and there were few incentives inviting 
foreign investment from any source, including the United States. Why would the U.S. 
invest here as opposed to investing in the Brazilian or Mexican economies, where there 
were policies in place to protect their investment? Venezuela's overall imports have 
doubled, while their exports have remained at nearly their 1990 levels ($19.9 billion in 
1999 vs. $17.6 billion in 1990). They do run a trade surplus, both globally and with the 
United States. Additionally, their per capita GNP has continued to slowly rise, in spite of 
the drop in U.S. investment that occurred as a result of the 1994 collapse of the banking 
system, and which still has not returned to its 1993 levels. This example alone would 
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seem to confirm that Brown, Garten, and others used good judgment in limiting BEM 
status to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. 
However, the case of Chile may lead to a different conclusion. In the 1990s, Chile 
has become more integrated into the international economy. The United States is Chile's 
second largest source of imports; in fact, Chile bought more than twice as many U.S. 
goods at the end of the decade than in 1990. Similarly, Chile's imports of goods from the 
rest of the world have doubled as well. They run virtually no trade deficit with either the 
United States or with the world as a whole. Their per capita GNP has tripled, and the 
level of direct investment from the United States has doubled. Further, Chile is a part of 
APEC, both foreign and domestic investment have reached record levels, and the U.S. 
has partnered with Chile in an environmental framework agreement through which 
Chilean payments of aid loans go toward domestic environmental projects. Chile may 
not be a big emerging market, but it clearly has enormous growth potential and will 
certainly be a contributing factor in U.S. economic growth, both in our export industries 
as well as in returns on foreign investment. 
Since one of the goals of engagement and enlargement is democracy promotion 
and a heightened respect for human rights, it is important that we look at the human 
rights record in these countries (see Figure 2). It would be expected that as trade 
increased, human rights practices would also increase; in other words, in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, we would expect that as trade increased over the decade, 
respect for human rights would also increase. We would expect in the case of Venezuela 
to see little change over the course of the decade. However, in Argentina human rights 
32 
conditions were actually slightly worse by 1999 than they were at the start of the decade. 
Freedom House ranked Argentina as 1 in the political freedom category, and 2 in civil 
freedom in 1990; for the years 1993 - 1998 it was ranked 2,3 and in 1999 it was ranked 
3 ,3. The State Department cites the frequent occurrences of police ignoring individual 
rights toward the end of the decade, and Amnesty International points to the credible 
reports of torture as a reason for the deterioration in human rights scores. The Human 
Development Index (HDI), measuring various quality of life indicators, has declined over 
this period as well; in fact, the HDI has slipped in a pattern parallel to the Freedom 
House scores. 







Figure 2: Freedom House Scores for Latin America 
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Similarly, in the early 1990s in Brazil there were numerous extra-judicial killings 
by both the police and by vigilante groups: hundreds die annually. In rural areas, land 
disputes result in people being forced from their homes and their land, and in many cases 
no one is ever prosecuted. Even at the end of the decade, credible reports of torture have 
been reported, homeless children were murdered by death squads, prisoners endured 
horrific conditions, and both human rights and labor activists were targeted and 
intimidated. It should be pointed out that while Brazil's Freedom House scores have 
worsened over the decade, (from 2,2 in 1990 to 3,4 in 1999), the 1989 Presidential 
election was the first direct presidential election in 25 years, and democracy in its fullest 
sense is still an unfamiliar concept to most Brazilians. Still, the fact remains that the 
quality of life has deteriorated throughout the 1990s in spite of increased trade with the 
United States (the HDI was .784 in 1990, and was .739 in 1999). It seems apparent that 
Brazil's democracy is not being strengthened by our engagement and enlargement 
strategy. While the U.S. economy has grown through its contact with Brazil, conditions 
for the people of Brazil are deteriorating. 
Among the non-BEM countries, Freedom House scores in Venezuela fell slightly 
during the mid-decade but then improved somewhat. The human rights issues in 
Venezuela are no doubt a result of its recent transition to democracy: elections occurred 
for the first time in 1989. It has yet to eradicate completely abuses by the police, and 
allegations of torture are still reported. However, its commitment to democracy is 
evidenced by the assistance it gave Nicaragua in organizing its 1990 elections, and by its 
promise to respect human rights, self-determination, the principle of non-intervention, 
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and to support democracy. Few nations make such a commitment when its own 
democracy is still in its infancy. Perhaps Venezuela is not BEM material: perhaps when 
it comes down to actually 'strengthening the community of democracies,' Venezuela is 
better off without help from the United States. 
Likewise, Chile has seen its human rights record improve over the 1990s (from 
4,3 to 3,2). Human rights are generally respected in Chile; investigations do occur into 
allegations of human rights abuses. Extra-judicial killings by the police occurred early in 
the decade, but none were reported in the latter half of the 1990s. Abuses by the police 
are investigated when reported. The quality of life, as reflected in the HDI, has declined, 
but only slightly: from .931 in 1990 to .894 in 1999. It seems as though Chile is one 
nation that will achieve real economic growth and human rights improvements regardless 
of its BEM status. 
Conditions in Latin America show that the Clinton premise that trade can be used 
as a tool to bring about improvements in countries' human rights practices is not valid. It 
was expected that as trade increased in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, human rights 
would also improve, but this was not the case. In Argentina and Brazil, human rights 
deteriorated over the decade, while in Mexico there was no significant change. 
Expectations that the non-BEM countries of Chile and Venezuela would see little change 
in human rights practices in response to increases in trade were met in both instances. 
Asia. Most of the world has felt some impact from the financial crisis that plagued Asia 
in the mid-to-late 1990s. The U.S. is no exception, as trade with many Asian nations 
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decreased and some U.S. investors scaled back operations in Asia, as evidenced by 
reductions in U.S. direct investment. China is an important factor in the U.S. political 
and economic agenda. According to the State Department, China's economic output will 
be 10 trillion dollars by mid-century. As China enters the market, world commerce will 
expand. China is second only to the United States in receipt of foreign direct investment, 
and the U.S. has targeted China in its BEM strategy because it is trying to bring China 
into the market system. Its participation in the global economy will increase China's 
stake in the stability and prosperity of Asia, making it less likely to generate conflict. 
After all, it makes little sense to attack your neighbors if they are a major contributor to 
your country's prosperity. Rather than to continue the practice of issuing annual 
condemnations of China's human rights problems in hope that the will suddenly realize 
the error of their ways, it seems that integrating them into the international community, 
whose members operate in an environment of interdependence, may be more effective. 
The U.S. is hoping that India's potential prosperity will have a similar effect, 
causing it to seek peace in its dealings with Pakistan. The U.S. is India's largest trading 
partner, and as such stands to benefit from its economic prosperity. Unfortunately, 
India's purchases of U.S. exports have only increased by approximately 50% over the 
decade (see Figure 3). India has, however, reduced its tariffs from 300% to 50%, 
privatized state owned utilities, and in the early-1990s it opened its doors to foreign 
investors for the first time. Its growth rate was 3.8% in 1994, and increased to 6.8% in 
1999. Key to this growth is India's diversified industrial base and its modern commercial 
and legal code. U.S. investors are generally more inclined to invest money in countries 
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that have legal measures already in place to protect the investment. Key to growth in 
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Indonesia is another nation of strategic importance to the United States; its 
stability is key to regional stability, and with China was the only BEM without a truly 
democratic form of government throughout the decade of the 1990s ( Garten, 1997). 
Indonesia receives billions in U.S. investment, and is an ASEAN member. It has the 
potential to be an important market for U.S. exports, as is South Korea. South Korea is 
the most highly industrialized of all the BEMs, and in spite of trade barriers that were 
erected in 1994-95, both imports and exports have increased by 30%. South Korea is the 
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eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the 13th largest economy in the 
world (Garten, 1997). 
South Korean per capita GNP had tripled by 1998, although it dropped slightly in 
1999, as did that oflndonesia. U.S. investment in South Korea decreased by 33% over 
the course of the decade, likely a result of the Asian financial crisis. South Korea has yet 
to become as important of a factor in the BEM strategy as the U.S. would have hoped: 
Korean purchases of U.S. exports did increase from $14 .4. billion to $23 billion, but the 
United States likewise increased its purchase of Korean goods from $19.2 to $31.2 
billion, creating a U.S. trade deficit with South Korea. The U.S. also has a trade deficit 
with Indonesia, India, and a huge deficit with China (prompting one to wonder if in fact 
the BEM strategy was designed by U.S. policymakers to increase U.S. exports). 
The U.S. has purchased three times more Indian goods in 1999 than in 1990, 
twice the 1990 amount from Indonesia, and purchases of Chinese goods have increased 
more than fourfold. The U. S has tripled its investment in China, from $2.1 billion in 
1990 to $7.8 billion in 1999; while its investment in Indonesia has increased from $8 
billion to $10.5 billion. Investment in India has dropped slightly. Per capita GNP in India 
has only increased slightly over the decade, while in China it has increased from $3 3 0 in 
1990 to $780 in 1999. It appears that in these two heavily populated countries, wealth 
trickles down to the average person slowly, if at all. 
Pakistan was considered when BEMs were being named, and was taken out of the 
running simply because its economic potential seemed to be less impressive than India's. 
Russia was also considered, but was not included because "it was not far enough along 
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with its economic reforms, its political leadership seemed too precarious, and 
consequently the prospects for progress were simply too uncertain" (Garten, 1997: 15). In 
the case of Russia, its entire economy endured major economic upheaval with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the GDP fell in the early 1990s. In spite of this, Russia 
has made some progress along the road to economic reform. Industries and resources 
were privatized, and by the mid- l 990s more than 50% of GDP was being produced in the 
private sector. The practice of subsidizing domestic products while maintaining barriers 
to imports was discontinued in 1994. Disposable income has increased by 10%, which is 
somewhat odd given that per capita GDP fell during this time. Perhaps the concurrent 
decline in population played a role in this phenomenon. The United States runs a deficit 
with Russia: we purchased $6.1 billion in Russian goods in 1999, while exporting $2.2 
billion in goods to Russia. The U.S. also gives a great deal of aid to Russia: USAID gave 
$1. 6 billion to Russia in 1994 alone to help Russia develop democratic institutions. 
While sponsoring this and other aid programs, however, U.S investment hit a high of $1.4 
billion in 1997, then fell dramatically to $509 million. This reduction in aid likely 
resulted when the United States realized that Russian officials were pilfering funds meant 
for development and humanitarian projects. 
U.S. investment in Pakistan remained steady through the 1990s - only rising from 
$433 million in 1990 to $488 million in 1999. Pakistan bought $488 million of U.S. 
goods in 1990, rising sharply mid-decade and falling to $459 million in 1999. The U.S. 
runs a trade deficit with Pakistan, and purchased three times more Pakistani goods in 
1999 than in 1990. Per capita GNP in Pakistan is very low; still only $470 in 1999. It is 
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apparent that these two countries have a long way to go to become BEMs. 
Perhaps, however, the economic struggle facing these two countries is precisely 
the reason the U.S. should target them if not as BEMS, then as the focus of some other 
initiative designed to improve conditions abroad with the eventual goal of creating a new 
market for U.S. goods. Certainly these countries are of strategic importance to the U.S. 
But if these countries were targeted, and investment began to flow into diverse sectors of 
the economy, it is possible that jobs would be created, personal income would increase, 
and a middle class hungry for consumer goods would emerge. 
But what impact does the enormous amount of trade between the Asian BEMs 
and the United States have on human rights in these countries (see Figure 4)? 
Unfortunately, in spite of the United States' engagement with China over the course of 
the 1990s, 1999 saw the biggest crackdown on peaceful dissent since the Tiananmen 
Square incident of 1989. Thousands of Chinese have been detained for using their 
constitutional rights of expression, association, or religion (frustrating as it may be to the 
communist government, the Chinese Constitution does in fact give to its people many of 
the same rights held by U.S. citizens). Amnesty International reports people being 
assigned to labor camps to be "re-educated" without due process. Scores of political 
dissidents were detained at the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. It is 
reported that torture continues to occur, that the police engage in violent or intimidating 
behavior directed toward minorities, and that members of various religious groups have 
been detained or given long jail sentences. Conditions for the average Chinese have 
deteriorated, as evidenced by the HDI, which fell from .716 in 1990 to .566 in 1993; 
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however, this number rebounded to .701 by 1999. Freedom House ranks China as not 
free throughout this entire period, although it is acknowledged that China has begun to 
prosecute officials who engage in unlawful behaviors such as torture or bribery. 
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Quality of life in India is even worse than in China. The HDI in India hit a low of 
.297 in 1992, but rebounded to .542 in 1999. Freedom House scores dipped along with 
the HDI, but ended the decade at 1990 levels. India still sees a great deal of caste 
violence, although the caste system has officially been abolished. Still, inter-caste 
violence is rarely prosecuted. Extra-judicial killings are common, as are reprisal killings 
and wife murder. Detainees are often tortured, and security forces have authority to shoot 
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to kill. Conditions in Indonesia are similar, although some progress has been made in the 
human rights arena. The press became more assertive, and was censored less often; 
additionally, public dialogue on human rights occurred, and a national human rights 
committee was developed. The police force was separated from the military at the end of 
the decade, and the repeal of an anti-subversion law meant that the police had lost their 
last legitimate means by which citizens could be detained and held indefinitely. 
South Korea is the only Asian BEM the Clinton Administration could hold up as a 
shining example of the effectiveness of "enlargement" as a tool to effect change in human 
rights and respect for democracy. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of engagement may 
have had a lesser impact than did the 1993 election, which greatly improved human rights 
due to the policy shift made by the incoming administration. South Korea has been 
ranked as free throughout the decade of the 1990s. The primary criticism leveled at 
South Korea by Amnesty International relates to the conditions of Korean prisons, which 
are poor. 
Living conditions and human rights fared no better in the non-BEM countries of 
Asia. For example, Pakistan is a country of extreme poverty, underdevelopment and 
illiteracy. Pakistan has an HDI of .508 - not surprising, given its 26% literacy rate. 
Pakistan is considered free by Freedom House, although there is room for improvement 
in human rights practices, as extra-judicial killings occur, torture has been reported, and 
child labor and trafficking in women are often ignored by the police. However, the new 
government in Pakistan has made some commitments to protecting human rights, and has 
already begun to end corruption within the government and police (Amnesty 
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International, 2000). Russia's 'partly free' ranking has been consistent, and stems from 
the uncoordinated transition to democracy it undertook early in the decade. Additionally, 
there have been abuses by the military throughout Russia's war against Chechnya. There 
has been a general disregard for the rule of law within Russia, and political killings have 
been reported. The HDI has declined in Russia, from .92 in 1990, when education and 
income were virtually guaranteed, to .747 by the end of the decade. 
The Rest. The remaining three BEMs are of extremely important strategic significance. 
Poland is a beacon of light that the U.S. hopes will guide the way down the path toward 
economic growth and development for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Poland is the largest nation in Eastern Europe, and is the first post-communist country to 
emerge from the recession that occurred after the collapse of the USSR Its economic 
reforms were impressive, stopping hyperinflation, stabilizing the economy, and ending 
shortages of consumer goods. Poland quickly embraced democracy and privatized its 
state owned industries. Two million new businesses were established in the 1990s. The 
per capita income doubled over the course of the decade. U.S. investment in Poland, 
virtually zero in 1990, was 1.9 billion in 1999. Poland has doubled its purchases of U.S. 
goods (see Figure 5). 
South Africa is strategically important to the U.S. as well, as it is the most 
democratic nation in Africa, and has the strongest military, which has proven itself to be 
an important resource to the region. South African per capita GNP was $3, 160 in 1999 -
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the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. direct investment has not substantially 
increased over this period, nor has their consumption of U.S. goods. The U.S. has, 
however, increased its purchase of South African goods, and has a trade deficit with 
South Africa. Turkey's importance to the United States lies in its location. Situated 
between Europe and the Middle East, it stands as a bulwark against the spread of 
European fundamentalism into Europe. Turkey is also a large potential market for U.S. 
products. Its per capita GNP has doubled over the decade. However, its purchase of U.S. 
goods has not significantly increased, and U.S. direct investment has fallen 50%. This is 
unfortunate, as Turkey has fairly liberal laws regulating direct investment, on which the 
U.S could capitalize (Garten, 1997). The U.S. has, however, continued to buy products 
from Turkey, doubling its consumption over the decade. 
Turkey's economic situation is not the only thing that seems to have stalled over 
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the decade. Its human rights record is similarly stagnant (see Figure 6), as evidenced by 
its seeming distaste for any meaningful change in policies. The HDI has not significantly 
declined; however, Freedom House, which placed Turkey in the partly free category until 
1994, has ranked it as not free during the remainder of the decade. Turkey limits the 
freedoms of assembly and association for its citizens. Political and extra-judicial killings 
still occur, as does torture, although officially the practice is banned. The military use 
force against non-combatants. However, there is some hope, as the government has made 
some efforts toward improving human rights and has removed military judges from 
courts. Additionally, the President has met with NGOs, and a human rights NGO has re-
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South Africa has made some meaningful progress in its efforts to improve human 
rights. The 1994 Constitution abolished the black "homelands," and instead divided the 
country into nine provinces. The Constitution gives 25 rights, including universal 
suffrage, due process, and freedom of movement and assembly, to all citizens. Freedom 
House scores improved greatly over the decade, and the HDI remained in the high .60s -
low . 70s. However, there is a 3 5% unemployment rate, affecting mostly black workers. 
There was some violence stemming from those opposed to the democratic transition early 
in the decade, but this has subsided; unfortunately, however, political killings still occur. 
Poland is a human rights success story. Free and fair elections were held in 1990, 
and freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and the press are upheld. No serious human 
rights violations have occurred. Poland's HDI has declined, but is still relatively high. 
Freedom House has ranked Poland as free since 1991, an amazing feat for a 10 year old 
democracy. These three countries have yet to fulfill their BEM potential, although 
Poland has made remarkable progress, even with the relatively low levels of U.S. 
investment it receives as opposed to the other countries. 
How have similar countries fared in their quest for growth and development? For 
example, Hungary, which made its transition to democracy in 1989, more than doubled 
its purchased of U.S. goods by the end of the decade. The U.S. increased its purchases of 
Hungarian exports over this period as well, from $340 million to $1.9 billion, and the 
U.S. now has a $1. 5 billion trade deficit with Hungary. Hungary receives over half of all 
foreign investment in Eastern Europe and total trade exceeded $800 million as early as 
1993. Hungary receives U.S. aid in the form of the SEED Act (Support for Eastern 
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European Democracy), which has provided more than 136 million to Hungary for 
economic restructuring and private sector developments. Hungary seems to be a country 
which would benefit from the additional attention it would receive from being a BEM, 
and it is certainly a country that could be tapped as a market for U.S. goods. Its imports 
from the world as a whole have tripled, which may be a sign that the market is hungry for 
consumer goods. 
When the BEMs initiative was being developed, Greece complained that it too 
should be included, but its strategic significance was not as great as was Turkey's 
(Garten, 1997). However, Greece has increased its purchase of U.S. goods to $1. 1 billion 
annually, up from $729 million in 1990. U.S. consumption of Greek goods has increased 
as well, but the U.S. runs a trade surplus with Greece of approximately $500 million. Per 
capita GDP has more than doubled, while U.S. investment has declined. 
Jeffrey Garten points out that none of the BEMs are able to pursue continued 
growth and expansion without foreign investment (1997:30). Many countries are able to 
fund a certain level of investment domestically, as they have high domestic savings rates; 
further, these savings act to lure investors to these countries. This is the case with the 
Asian BEMs, where savings rates are as high as 35% of national income. These savings 
can be used to fund research and development, in addition to education and 
infrastructure. A strong infrastructure with modern transportation and communications 
systems are a compelling reason to invest in a country. There is a great deal of room for 
industrial expansion in the BEMs, since in many countries the industrial base is in one 
city or region - for example, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on China's southern coast, and in 
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Jakarta, Indonesia (Garten, 1997:31). In addition to the obvious benefit of expansion, 
corporations can benefit from having a global market since it can "spread its fixed costs 
more broadly than if it operated only in the United States. A company that exports has 
diversified its markets, thereby helping to reduce its risks should economic conditions at 
home deteriorate" (Garten, 1997:33). 
One of the problems of increased trade with the BEMs will be trade deficits. 
These will occur as the BEMs will be reluctant to lower their tariffs until their industries 
have become firmly established; however at the same time the U.S. will be forced to 
purchase their exports, or there will be no incentive for the BEMs to pursue liberalization. 
The influx of cheaper imports will likely lead to what Garten calls a "long period of 
downward pressure on American wages" (1997:45). The low prices of foreign imports 
will offset any decline in wages; however, Garten points out that the benefits of the low 
prices may not occur simultaneously with the drop in wages, and the standard of living 
for U.S. workers may be endangered (1997). 
While the BEM strategy was designed to boost the U.S. economy, it is also 
necessary to discuss its political impact on these countries. It is believed that "the best 
way to ensure that these nations act peacefully and cooperatively is to encourage them to 
participate in the international institutions that have been built up over the past fifty 
years" (Garten, 1997: 65). Democracy and free markets "go hand in hand" (Garten, 
1997:74), as both systems necessitate citizen participation. At the same time, however, 
these systems are actually incongruent: democracy leads to equality, while capitalism 
generally widens inequalities (Garten, 1997). 
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In light of the empirical evidence, then, it appears that the Clinton 
Administration's premise that trade integration results in improvements in countries' 
human rights practices is not the sound policy it was purported to be, either in terms of 
purchases of U.S. exports or human rights. In only two of the BEMs countries (Poland 
and South Africa) did the linkage between trade and human rights hold true; in the other 
eight countries human rights either remained static or deteriorated. The non-BEM 
countries, as expected, had static levels of human rights, with the exception of Hungary, 
which saw improvements over the decade. Hence the BEMs strategy was neither good 
human rights policy, nor sound economic policy. This result emphasizes the fact that if 
the U.S. truly wants to promote democracy abroad and to continue to fight human rights 
abuses, policymakers need to generate specific policies geared toward these issues 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The engagement and enlargement agenda in general, and the BEMs 
strategy in particular, were created to boost the U.S. economy by creating new markets 
for our exports, increasing productivity and creating jobs at home. Additionally, this 
strategy also indirectly pursued the latent goal of improving human rights. This chapter 
will outline the relative success or failure of the BEMs strategy, and will outline some 
suggestions for a more direct human rights agenda, as well as a potentially more 
appropriate forum to address these issues. 
How effective was the BEMs strategy in achieving the goals the Clinton 
Administration had set for it? Jeffrey Garten stated that U.S. exports by the year 2000 
would reach $97 billion to Indonesia, $236 billion to South Korea, $36 billion to South 
Africa, and $79 billion to India (Garten, 1997). Did exports levels actually meet this 
expectation? Not quite .... U.S. exports to Indonesia for the year 1999 were $1.9 billion, 
to South Korea $23 billion, to South Africa $2.8 billion, and $3.7 billion to India. These 
numbers do not exactly inspire confidence that this is the best way to boost the U.S. 
economy, or the need for the BEMs strategy. It could be argued that these optimistic 
projections were made before the gravity of the Asian financial crisis was realized, and 
that may be a fair point. However, the reality of only reaching 10% of the projected 
export levels makes one wonder if the financial resources poured into the BEMs strategy 
- which included things like establishing Joint Commissions on Commerce and Trade, 
providing technical assistance, establishing American Commercial centers in Sao Paulo 
and Jakarta, and setting up "one-stop-shops" for international trade in cities throughout 
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the Untied States (Scott, 1997:40) - was worth it. In fact, it would be accurate to say that 
the BEMs strategy as economic policy was a failure. While U.S. exports did increase, 
they never came close to approaching their projected levels. 
The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) in 1996 "claimed that it 
had assisted in more than 230 contracts accounting for $42 billion in U.S. exports" 
(1996). It has been stated that export promotion "return about four dollars for every one 
dollar spent by the government" (Trumbull, 1995). Additionally, U.S. exports since 1992 
have increased from $618 billion to $800 billion by 1996 (Scott, 1997:44). 
Unfortunately, however, there are several potential problems that may cast a 
shadow on the Clintonian image of newly enfranchised middle class consumers 
purchasing U.S. goods and causing the U.S. economy to expand indefinitely. One of 
these problems is the aforementioned surpluses that some countries are running with the 
United States, while at the same time some of the BEMs also receive large amounts of 
U.S. investment. This may eventually lead to jobs in certain sectors of the U.S. economy 
fleeing to labor intensive countries - exactly the opposite effect the Clinton 
Administration was hoping to achieve. In fact, while the Clinton Administration claimed 
that "increasing exports would help to create new jobs at home at higher wages, and do 
so quickly" (Scott, 1997:45), this does not quite ring true in the ears of those who have 
lost jobs and cannot earn a decent wage. Additionally, the cynicism that results among 
the American public may serve to create a rise in protectionist ideology, and may hurt the 
U.S. economy in the long term. 
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The other big problem with the BEM strategy is that "with its emphasis on 
commercial interests, [it] entails substantive trade-offs among security, humanitarian, and 
other goals" (Scott, 1997, 55). The Clinton Administration, rather than acknowledging 
that such trade-offs exist, claims that the economic goals are congruent with humanitarian 
goals, even if there is no direct impact. There is merit to the argument that attempts to 
link economic issues with non-economic goals like increasing respect for human rights 
will be detrimental to U.S. interests. When the U.S. criticized ASEAN for its welcoming 
Burma, a country guilty of countless human rights abuses, into its fold, ASEAN ignored 
us and accepted Burma anyway (Garten, 1997:95). The United States has little pull in the 
economic arena when the object of its criticism can simply cease trade with us and begin 
importing from the European Union, Japan, or Latin America. The de-linking of human 
rights from China's most-favored nation status is evidence that the U.S. is aware that its 
influence on issues of human rights is weakening. So what alternative does the U.S. have 
if it wants to effect change in human rights abroad? It is time for a new policy that would 
specifically emphasize democracy and human rights promotion. The sad fact is, "in spite 
of the evidence that suggests the BEM strategy is helping to increase U.S. exports, there 
is virtually no evidence that other purposes and interests that the U.S. holds in and around 
the BEMs have been furthered" (Scott, 1997:57). Certainly, human rights conditions in 
China, Brazil, or Turkey have not been improved with increased trade. How, then can 
Washington address human rights issues and promote democracy? These goals are - or 
should be - still important in foreign policy considerations. After all, the more countries 
that share our values, the less conflict there will be. Additionally, the United States has 
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always been the primary supporter of humanitarian endeavors in the world. lfwe choose 
to ignore gross violations of human rights perpetrated on innocent peoples around the 
world, who is left to help them? It is time to develop a true agenda for human rights 
promotion. 
The primary agenda of the United States government is to promote its own 
economic growth, and its foreign policy reflects this priority. In achieving this goal, 
post-Cold War administrations have found that there is also advantage to be gained by 
promoting growth in other countries as well (i.e., increased wealth abroad increased the 
number of U.S. goods that are exported, creating wealth and jobs at home). Promoting 
trade relations with other nations puts the United States in an awkward position in 
relation to human rights abroad: to condemn harshly the practices of other countries may 
result in a loss of market share rather than a gain, and may result in a decrease in wealth 
rather than increased prosperity. 
It appears that the claims of the Clinton Administration that a direct and rapid 
connection between human rights and trade cannot be supported. Linkages among and 
between commerce, democracy and peace may flourish, but the time link may not be 
quick and the connections may be more indirect and cumulative than obvious and 
specific. If the United States is truly dedicated to promoting democracy and human 
rights abroad, it is time to develop policies that will actually achieve this goal. If the 
United States' only goal is to increase its own wealth and to expand its market share, then 
it should be honest about this agenda and abandon the phony rhetoric. 
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If the U.S. is committed to the ideals of democracy and human rights promotion, 
it seems that foreign investment and increases in wealth alone cannot be the only 
instrument through which this is achieved. The United States might instead consider 
several other methods. First, there should be strong consideration given to implementing 
some guidelines that multinational corporations would be encouraged to abide by, most 
likely through tax incentives. Obviously some incentive would have to exist: the 
likelihood of a MNC voluntarily taking measures to improve rather than to exploit 
conditions abroad is slim. Perhaps a revision of the Sullivan Principles - which were 
designed in 1985 to be a code of conduct for MNCs to adhere to in their operations in 
South Africa - is in order. The original set of principles prohibited racial discrimination, 
required blacks to be trained for supervisory positions, required the MNC to work to 
improve living and health standards for its black employees, and required the MNC to 
press for revisions in South African society - including a repeal of segregation laws (NY 
Times, Sept. 9, 1985). These principles could be revised and expanded to protect the 
citizens of all foreign countries, and MNCs should again be encouraged to abide by them. 
Perhaps multinationals should be encouraged to not merely invest in plant facilities, but 
also to invest a certain percentage of profits made in a country back into that country -
perhaps into the local infrastructure. Given the labor advantages that are abundant in 
developing nations, the MNC will still be reaping a substantial profit. In addition, MNCs 
should be compelled to obey the same labor and safety laws that they would observe if 
operating in this country, and penalized and/or fined for violations. This could be 
accomplished through tax incentives offered to corporations in observance of these laws 
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in their foreign operations, and through tax penalties that would accrue to companies 
refusing to observe these laws. If there is any truth in the premise that the presence and 
example of1\1NCs can encourage better human rights and promote democratic principles, 
then it would be in the best interest of the government to ensure that these 1\1NCs are 
truly representing the democratic principles of the United States and not merely operating 
in their own interests. 
Second, the United States ought to consider using its influence in the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to develop a plan by which credit 
and/or aid could be more easily attained. Some efforts have already been initiated, in 
particular the implementation of debt forgiveness for some of the poorest developing 
nations. Current World Bank policies that require structural adjustments before loans are 
given, which may take years for a country to effectively implement, are not working. 
Continuing these practices would be a mistake. While some criteria should be met before 
loans are given, these could relate to freedoms and civil rights, and not solely to 
economic reform. This would help to ensure that the average citizen would at least see 
an increase in freedom and opportunities rather than simply being subjected to the 
negative impact of structural adjustments ( e.g., devalued currency, price increases, fewer 
jobs). Debt forgiveness for human rights improvements should be a part of this package 
as well, since many developing countries have debt in excess of their GNP which will 
likely never be repaid. The World Bank and the developed nations would be better 
served by writing off much of this debt and allowing developing nations to use the money 
55 
for basic needs, like clean drinking water, food, education, and communication and 
transportations systems. 
Next, the U.S. should continue its practice of giving aid to countries that 
are struggling to build some measure of democracy. This aid may be through grants from 
the National Endowment for Democracy, or perhaps the U.S. could increase its foreign 
aid budget for these purposes. Institution building in developing nations is important in 
effecting changes in human rights and furthering democracy. Aid packages could be 
designed which would be used to support citizen groups or labor organizations which 
would in turn serve to press for human rights reforms. It is participation in institutions at 
all levels of society that lays a foundation for a democratic form of government; however, 
these institutions must be supported if they are to survive. 
In promoting human rights, there will be trade-offs that will need to be 
addressed. For example, the promotion of human rights will cost money, whether it be in 
the form of grants, tax incentives, lost revenues, or in costs related to providing security 
for nations on the path toward democracy. This will obviously appear to conflict with the 
United States agenda pursuing economic growth - it is difficult to sell a particular policy 
as being designed to achieve economic growth at home when there are immediate costs 
involved in its implementation. Restrictions on MNCs may result in certain corporations 
divesting themselves of U.S. holdings and locating elsewhere, but with the proper 
incentives and tax advantages this will surely be kept to a minimum. While tradeoffs are 
to be expected between competing policies, they should not be blatantly in favor of the 
economic agenda. 
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In developing a comprehensive human rights agenda, it is important to 
recognize that different cultures place various levels of importance on different human 
rights. Human rights are often viewed as existing in three tiers, or "generations." The 
first of these are civil/political rights, the second economic/social/cultural rights, and the 
last is peoples' rights (Mahubabani, 1999:94). However, even this ordering has a 
Western bias. The U.S. experience has not followed this pattern; rather, these processes 
have somewhat paralleled each other. Capitalism was completely entrenched long before 
all citizens had the benefit of legally protected civil rights, yet the right of citizens and 
states to exist without government interference is as old as our Constitution, which was 
written at the same time capitalism was corning into its own. Yet during the last century, 
a lack of political or civil rights in a country is often an excuse for an intervention of the 
U.S. into the domestic affairs of another sovereign state, usually in the never-ending 
quest for new markets. Mahbubani notes that economic power alone can "liberate" the 
Third World by shaking up old arrangements and allowing for greater participation in 
social and political decisions (1999:94). The need for this double standard is unclear, 
except for the fact that it allows its quest for wealth to be seen as less of an expression of 
inherent greed and more of a humanitarian intervention. 
Jiang Zemin has expressed some awareness that these processes are not 
generational or linear, but often parallel, and expressed this when he stated that "without 
social stability it will be impossible to achieve economic development, without economic 
development there will be no social progress, and without progress for the whole society 
it will be impossible for human beings to take their destiny in their own hands" ( quoted in 
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Sullivan, 1999: 13 2). Perhaps even President Jiang realizes that China is headed down a 
path toward greater respect for human rights. And certainly the United States does not 
believe that rights are generational, or else there would not be such a prominent focus on 
using economic policy to affect change in human rights practices in certain developing 
nations - including China. Apparently the one area where relativists and universalists 
agree is on the importance economic growth plays in the process of "human 
beings ... take[ing] their destiny in their own hands." 
Given that there are drawbacks and advantages to the positions of both cultural 
relativists and Western universalists, and that there is no one path toward a respect for 
individual rights (and that the U.S. has had a questionable human rights record for much 
of its existence), what kinds of judgments should be made about other countries human 
rights practices? Answering this question may actually prove quite difficult, since "there 
is no single 'Asian' or 'non-Western' view [of human rights], just as there are various 
'Western' understandings of human rights" (Van Ness, 1999:8). 
Perhaps Mahbubani provides a starting point when he suggests several 
principles that should guide human rights discourse. The first of these is mutual respect. 
Mahbubani correctly points out that if one decides to wander downtown at night in any of 
the major cities in the United States, he is putting his life in danger; yet, "despite this, [no 
one] would argue in favor of the reduction of the civil liberties of habitual criminals" 
(1999:93). He goes on to note that in Singapore, one can freely and safely walk 
anywhere at night, because of the harsh penalties placed on criminals. The decisions 
each society makes in regard to civil liberties, freedom, and rights are equally valid, and 
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neither decision is morally superior to the other. These sorts of decisions are based upon 
values intrinsic to each society, and if each society is prepared to live with the 
consequences of its decision, then it ought not be criticized. Certainly Singapore should 
not be condemned for steps taken to protect the rights and lives of law-abiding citizens, 
because that society places great value on having a virtually crime-free environment that 
its citizens can enjoy at will. Similarly, the U.S. should not be criticized for its efforts to 
ensure that the civil rights of everyone living within its borders are protected, because its 
people place civil rights in high regard. 
The second principle Mahbubani offers as a guide for human rights discourse is 
economic development. He believes that economic development is the only "force" that 
has the potential to "shake up old social arrangements" and pave the way "for the 
participation of a greater percentage of society in social and political decisions" 
(1999:94). The Clinton Administration would have certainly agreed with Mahbubani on 
this point. The opening of China and the relaxation of the totalitarian regime that existed 
under Mao Zedong is an example of the power of economic development. However, it 
should be noted that Mahbubani includes economic development as part of a 
comprehensive agenda - not as the whole of the agenda. 
If human rights discourse requires an environment of mutual respect and an 
understanding that all rational decisions made in regard to individual rights that are 
congruent with societal values and norms are equally valid, then perhaps the appropriate 
arena in which human rights issues will best be discussed is a regional human rights 
institution. But does such a thing exist in Asia? Surprisingly, yes. In K wangu, Korea, 
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on May 17, 1998, a group of Asian human rights activists signed the Asian Human 
Rights Charter - an event that had been four years in the making. This Charter outlined 
the human rights issues relevant to Asian cultures, and it suggests ways to "strengthen 
human rights values within the context of Asian history and culture" (Lee, 1997). The 
Charter holds that the protection of human rights should be pursued at all levels, local 
national, regional and international" (Article 16.1). It adds further that Asian countries 
should adopt regional and sub-regional institutions in the process of promoting and 
protecting human rights (Article 16.2). Article 16.2 specifically states that any regional 
human rights convention "must address the realities of Asia" but must also "be fully 
consistent with international norms and standards." Within states, the Charter holds that 
human rights commissions need to be established to "provide easy, friendly, and 
inexpensive access to justice for victims of human rights violations" (Article 15.4c). It is 
within these sorts of procedural settings that international criticisms of a country's human 
rights practices should be addressed. 
It would be unfair and inappropriate to use a Western-biased institution and 
standards of human rights to adjudicate human rights issues in non-Western countries. 
National and regional human rights commissions and institutions will be able to offer 
legitimacy to the protection of individual rights, since it will be tempering any criticisms 
with the necessary respect for traditional Asian values. If the United States truly wants to 
promote human rights abroad, it will have to acknowledge that the policies of 
engagement and enlargement have failed to live up to their expectations. The stark 
reality is that instead of the economic gains the Clinton Administration believed could be 
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achieved in the process of promoting democracy and human rights, a comprehensive 
human rights agenda will actually cost something, both in terms of various foreign aid 
packages and in terms of commitment. Even the United States, with its relatively 
powerful influence, cannot affect change if it is not willing to persevere in the struggle to 
improve human rights around the globe. Time will tell if the new Administration is able 
to make this commitment. 
There is much research remaining to be undertaken in regard to understanding the 
effects of economic development on developing nations and their human rights practices. 
Further study should include examining human rights standards over a much longer 
period of time. Economic development and trade integration, while having little if any 
immediate impact on human rights, may in fact be useful tools in achieving more long-
term improvements. It may be that the BEMs strategy, although it appears to have been a 
failure in achieving improved human rights during the 1990s, may in fact be the impetus 
for improvements that will occur gradually over the next few decades. Additionally, the 
strategy may impact countries in some regions to a greater extend than others, and the 
degree of effectiveness may depend upon such factors as values and culture, something 
policymakers should consider. 
In pursuing further study of the economic growth/human rights linkage, it would 
be beneficial to develop new human rights and economic indicators. The human rights 
indicators used in this study may be considered by some to be too broad, and that more 
specific and detailed indicators may give a more accurate account of the level of a 
country's economic development. The aggregate economic indicators used here (per 
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capita GNP, imports from the U.S., and exports to the U.S.) are a good starting point in 
evaluating economic development, but I would suggest the need to develop more 
comprehensive economic indicators using factors such as literacy, access to clean water, 
number per thousand people who own a television, number per thousand people who own 
an automobile, educational opportunities, etc. Some of this information could be gleaned 
from the United Nations' Human Development Report. Any indicator comprised of such 
factors would offer a more detailed image of the true impact of economic development on 
a given society. More comprehensive human rights indicators should also be developed. 
In addition to developing the aforementioned indicators, it would also be useful to 
zero in on the process that occurs between economic development and improvements in 
human rights. It is during this state that a middle class and/or an entrepreneurial class 
emerges to take advantage of newfound opportunities. Developing a means to gauge the 
growth of this class, and to understand the process leading up to its emergence would be 
useful in understanding why economic penetration occurs with greater speed in some 
countries than in others, and would also assist policymakers in formulating effective 
policies. 
Future research should also include case studies that would examine one or two 
countries, and would detail both their economic and human rights conditions prior to the 
time they were targeted as a BEM, as well as examining the impact of the BEM strategy 
upon their country over the next few decades. Given that the number of BEM countries 
is limited (assuming that this strategy ended with the Clinton Administration), this 
research would not be overwhelming and could likely be detailed in a book length 
62 
project. Of course, given that an adequate period of time needs to pass before the post-
BEM research could be concluded, such an undertaking would not likely be begun for at 
least another decade. 
Finally, although conventional wisdom holds that economic development leads to 
improved human rights, there is some indication that the reverse may be true. It may be 
possible that as countries become more liberal and begin to make policies that protect and 
respect human rights, only then does trade liberalization and economic growth occur. 
This possibility should be considered, particularly to prevent further policy failures. If 
there is any merit in the idea that liberalism leads to economic development, this should 
be pursued. A strategy based on this idea would focus directly on the promotion of 
liberal democracy and human rights, and would likely benefit the citizens of developing 
nations more quickly than would reliance upon trade integration policies. A stable, 
liberal political system is a good foundation on which to base an open economic system. 
Such an environment reduces the likelihood of corruption, and creates a framework 
necessary for the equitable distribution of resources. If liberalism leads to economic 
development, then a comprehensive strategy needs to be developed to exploit this 
relationship. Better to pursue economic growth under the guise of promoting human 
rights than to pursue improved human rights under the guise of expanding the domestic 
economy. The policy that results will be much more straightforward, much less 
hypocritical, and, most importantly, much more effective for both the United States and 
developing nations. 
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APPENDIX A: FREEDOM HOUSE CHECKLIST AND METHODS 
Freedom House Political Rights Checklist 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected 
through free and fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and 
honest tabulation of ballots? 
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power? 
5. Do the people have the rights to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise 
and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through 
elections? 
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian 
parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal 
consensus in the decision-making process? 
Discretionary Questions 
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does 
the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion 
of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler? 
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic 
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the 
political balance in favor of another group? 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Checklist 
A. Freedom of Expression and Belief 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural 
expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state controlled but offer 
pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit). 
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public 
religious expression? 
B. Association and Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this 
includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.) 
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3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and 
is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and 
other private organizations? 
C. Rule of Law and Human Rights 
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule oflaw prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the 
population treated equally under the law? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? (Note: 
freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, 
but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a 
society free.) 
4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
D. Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights 
1. Is there open and free private discussion? 
2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of 
residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination 
and excessive dependency on the state? 
3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the rights to establish private 
businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government 
officials, the security forces, or organized crime? 
4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of 
marriage partners, and size of family? 
5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or 
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other 
types of obstacles to a share oflegitimate economic gains? 
The Survey rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 
representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular 
numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the Survey 
team at Freedom House. According to the methodology, the team assigns initial ratings to 
countries by awarding from O to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the 
comparative rights or liberties present. (In the Surveys completed from 1989-90 through 
1992-93, the methodology allowed for a less nuanced range of Oto 2 raw points per 
question.) The only exception to the addition of O to 4 raw points per checklist item is 
additional discretionary question B in the political rights checklist, for which 1 to 4 raw 
points are subtracted depending on the severity of the situation. The highest possible 
score for political rights is 32 points, based on up to 4 points for each of eight questions. 
The highest possible score for civil liberties is 56 points, based on up to 4 points for each 
of fourteen questions. 
After placing countries in initial categories based on checklist points, the Survey team 
makes minor adjustments to account for factors such as extreme violence, whose 
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intensity may not be reflected in answering the checklist questions. These exceptions 
aside, the results of the checklist system reflect real world situations and allow for the 
placement of countries and territories into their respective categories. 
Freedom House assigns upward or downward trend arrows to countries and territories to 
indicate general positive or negative trends that may not be apparent from the ratings. 
Such trends may or may not be reflected in raw points, depending on the circumstances in 
each country or territory. A country cannot receive both a numerical ratings change and a 
trend arrow in the same year, nor can it receive trend arrows in the same direction in two 
successive years. Distinct from the trend arrows which appear before the name of a 
country above its respective country report, the triangles located next to the political 
rights and civil liberties ratings (see accompanying tables of comparative measures of 
freedom for countries and related and disputed territories) indicate changes in those 
ratings caused by real world events since the last Survey. 
Without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an 
atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individual and 
group expression in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political 
ones. There is no country in the Survey with a rating of 6 or 7 for civil liberties and, at the 
same time, a rating of 1 or 2 for political rights. Almost without exception in the Survey, 
countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil liberties that are within 
two ratings numbers of each other. 
Explanation of Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings 
Political Rights Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 for political rights 
come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and 
fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political 
groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens 
enjoy self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of 
territories), and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the 
government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny 
island states, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and free 
subnational elections. 
Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. Such 
factors as gross political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, 
and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of 
democracy. 
The same conditions which undermine freedom in countries and territories with a rating 
of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other damaging 
elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering royal 
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power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these 
categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, including the freedom to 
organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of 
popular influence on government. 
Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military 
juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may 
allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as competitive local elections 
or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. Some countries and 
territories rated 6 are in the early or aborted stages of democratic transition. A few states 
are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the 
use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of political discussion, and acceptance 
of public petitions. 
For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or virtually 
nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in 
combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may also be marked by 
extreme violence or warlord rule which dominates political power in the absence of an 
authoritative, functioning central government. 
Civil Liberties Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 come closest to the 
ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, 
assembly, association, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and 
generally equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme 
government indifference and corruption. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy 
free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity. 
States and territories with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil 
liberties, but are still relatively free. 
Countries and territories which have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that 
are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a 
combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on 
other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, 
particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free 
association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in 
political terror that undermines other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country is 
not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government, but may reflect real 
restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental terror. 
Countries and territories rated 6 are characterized by a few partial rights, such as some 
religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and 
relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these states and territories 
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experience severely restricted expression and association, and there are almost always 
political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror. 
States and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and 
justified fear of repression characterizes these societies. 
Free, Partly Free, Not Free The Survey assigns each country and territory the status of 
"Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free" by averaging their political rights and civil liberties 
ratings. Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally considered "Free," 3-5.5 "Partly 
Free," and 5.5-7 "Not Free." The dividing line between "Partly Free" and "Not Free" 
usually falls within the group whose ratings numbers average 5.5. For example, countries 
that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political 
rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either "Partly Free" or "Not Free." The total 
number of raw points is the definitive factor which determines the final status. Countries 
and territories with combined raw scores of 0-30 points are "Not Free," 31-59 points are 
"Partly Free," and 60-88 are "Free." Based on raw points, this year there is one unusual 
case: Mali's ratings average 3.0, but it is "Free." 
It should be emphasized that the "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free" labels are highly 
simplified terms that each cover a broad third of the available raw points. Therefore, 
countries and territories within each category, especially those at either end of each 
category, can have quite different human rights situations. In order to see the distinctions 
within each category, one should examine a country or territory's political rights and civil 
liberties ratings. 
The differences in raw points between countries in the three broad categories represent 
distinctions in the real world. There are obstacles which "Partly Free" countries must 
overcome before they can be called "Free," just as there are impediments which prevent 
"Not Free" countries from being called "Partly Free." Countries at the lowest rung of the 
"Free" category (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3 in political rights and 2 
in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the "Partly Free" group (e.g., 3 for 
both political rights and civil liberties). Typically, there is more violence and/or military 
influence on politics at 3, 3 than at 2, 3. 
The distinction between the least bad "Not Free" countries and the least free "Partly 
Free" may be less obvious than the gap between "Partly Free" and "Free," but at "Partly 
Free," there is at least one additional factor that keeps a country from being assigned to 
the "Not Free" category. For example, Lebanon, which was rated 6, 5 "Partly Free" in 
1994, was rated 6, 5, but "Not Free," in 1995 after its legislature unilaterally extended the 
incumbent president's term indefinitely. Though not sufficient to drop the country's 
political rights rating to 7, there was enough of a drop in raw points to change its 
category. 
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Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the Survey recognizes 
that a democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of"Free" states. A 
democracy can lose freedom and become merely "Partly Free." Sri Lanka and Colombia 
are examples of such "Partly Free" democracies. In other cases, countries that replaced 
military regimes with elected governments can have less than complete transitions to 
liberal democracy. Guatemala fits the description of this kind of"Partly Free" 
democracy. Some scholars use the term "semi-democracy" or "formal democracy," 
instead of"Partly Free" democracy, to refer to countries that are democratic in form but 
less than free in substance. 
The designation "Free" does not mean that a country enjoys perfect freedom or lacks 
serious problems. As an institution which advocates human rights, Freedom House 
remains concerned about a variety of social problems and civil liberties questions in the 
U.S. and other countries that the Survey places in the "Free" category. An improvement 
in a country's rating does not mean that human rights campaigns should cease. On the 
contrary, the findings of the Survey should be regarded as a means to encourage 
improvements in the political rights and civil liberties conditions in all countries. 
All of the preceding information taken from Freedom House web site: 
www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology3. htm 
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APPENDIX B: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX EXPLANATION AND 
METHODS 
The Human Development Index (HDI) The first Human Development Report (1990) 
introduced a new way of measuring development - by combining indicators of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite human development index, 
the HDI (box 1). The breakthrough for the HDI was to find a common measuring rod for the 
socio-economic distance traveled. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each 
dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed 
as a value between 0 and 1. Since the minimum adult literacy rate is 0% and the maximum is 
100%, the literacy component of knowledge for a country where the literacy rate is 75% 
would be 0.75. Similarly, the minimum for life expectancy is 25 years and the maximum 85 
years, so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy is 55 years would be 
0.5. For income the minimum is $100 (PPP) and the maximum is $40,000 (PPP). Income 
above the average world income is adjusted using a progressively higher discount rate. The 
scores for the three dimensions are then averaged in an overall index. 
The HDI facilitates the determination of priorities for policy intervention and the evaluation 
of progress over time. It also permits instructive comparisons of the experiences within and 
between different countries. 
Why do we need a human development index? 
Because national progress tends otherwise to be measured by GNP alone, many people have 
looked for a better, more comprehensive socio-economic measure. The human development 
index is a contribution to this search. 
What does the HDI include? 
The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, 
knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is 
measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and mean years of schooling 
(one-third weight). Standard ofliving is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP 
per capita adjusted for the local cost ofliving (purchasing power parity, or PPP). 
Why only three components? 
The ideal would be to reflect all aspects of human experience. The lack of data imposes some 
limits on this, and more indicators could perhaps be added as the information becomes 
available. But more indicators would not necessarily be better. Some might overlap with 
existing indicators: infant mortality, for example, is already reflected in life expectancy. And 
adding more variables could confuse the picture and detract from the main trends. 
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How to combine indicators measured in different units? 
The measuring rod for GNP is money. The breakthrough for the HDI, however, was to find a 
common measuring rod for the socio-economic distance traveled. The HDI sets a minimum 
and a maximum for each dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to 
these scales-expressed as a value between O and 1. So, since the minimum adult literacy rate 
is 0% and the maximum is 100%, the literacy component of knowledge for a country where 
the literacy rate is 75% would be 0.75. Similarly, the minimum for life expectancy is 25 years 
and the maximum 85 years, so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy 
is 5 5 years would be O. 5. For income the minimum is $200 (PPP) and the maximum is 
$40,000 (PPP). Income above the average world income is adjusted using a progressively 
higher discount rate. The scores for the three dimensions are then averaged in an overall 
index. 
Is it not misleading to talk of a single HDI for a country with great inequality? 
National averages can conceal much. The best solution would be to create separate HDis for 
the most significant groups: by gender, for example, or by income group, geographical 
region, race or ethnic group. Separate HDis would reveal a more detailed profile of human 
deprivation in each country, and disaggregated HDis are already being attempted for 
countries with sufficient data. 
How can the HDI be used? 
The HDI offers an alternative to GNP for measuring the relative socio-economic progress of 
nations. It enables people and their governments to evaluate progress over time-and to 
determine priorities for policy intervention. It also permits instructive comparisons of the 
experiences in different countries. 
Reproduced from HDR 1994 
The disaggregated HDI. One way the use of the human development index has been 
improved is through disaggregation. A country's overall index can conceal the fact that 
different groups within the country have very different levels of human development. 
Disaggregated HDis are arrived at by using the data for the HDI components pertaining to 
each of the groups into which the HDI is disaggregated, treating each group as if it were a 
separate country. Such groups may be defined relative to geographical or administrative 
regions, urban-rural residence, gender and ethnicity. 
Using disaggregated HDis at the national and sub-national levels helps highlight the 
significant disparities and gaps: among regions, between the sexes, between urban and rural 
areas and among ethnic groups. The analysis made possible by the use of the disaggregated 
HDis should help guide policy and action to address gaps and inequalities. For example, it 
can help restructure public expenditure (or aid allocations) to regions and/or groups with low 
HDI ranking. 
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Disparities may already be well known, but the HDI can reveal them even more starkly. The 
disaggregation prepared for the 1993 Report on the differences in living conditions in the 
United States among blacks, hispanics and whites spurred a great deal of policy debate. 
Disaggregation by social group or region can also enable local community groups to press for 
more resources, making the HDI a tool for participatory development. It can also be used to 
hold local representatives accountable. 
A study of Poland (Mijakowska 1993), for example, calculates HDis for 49 administrative 
units. The indexes range from 0.739 to 0.916. Twenty one of them are at medium level and 
twenty eight of them at high HD. Weighing by population one may say that seventy four 
percent enjoy high HD and twenty six percent medium level of HD. Disaggregated HDis 
have been used for analysis in other countries, including: Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, 
Gabon, Germany, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine and USA. 
Country-specific HDis To reflect country-specific priorities and problems and to be more 
sensitive to a country's development level, the basic components of the HDI appearing in the 
global HDRs could be supplemented or replaced by other more relevant components. The 
same methodology used to construct the global HDI could be applied to a set of other 
components to construct country specific HDis that both reflect national priorities and are 
more sensitive to policy changes. For example, unemployment could become a component of 
the national HDI in countries where it is considered as a priority problem. 
Countries with a medium level of human development (say with an HDI between 0.800 and 
0.500), could add one supplementary indicator for each of the three categories of basic 
variables. In the survival/longevity category, for example, we can add under-5 (i.e. infant and 
child mortality); in the education category we could add secondary school enrolment; and 
income category we add the incidence of income poverty in the country. For countries with a 
"high" level of human development (say with an HDI value greater than 0.800), we could add 
a further supplementary indicator to the two already existing for each category in the medium 
human development group. In the survival (longevity) category, we could add the maternal 
mortality rate; in the education category, we could add tertiary enrolment; and in the income 
category, we could add the Gini-corrected mean national income (i.e. per capita GDP 
multiplied by (1-G)). 
It is difficult to use the HDI to monitor changes in human development in the short-term 
because two of its components, namely life expectancy and adult literacy change slowly. To 
address this limitation, components that are more sensitive to short-term changes could be 
added to the national HDI. For example, the rate of employment, the percent of population 
with access to health services, or the daily caloric intake as a percentage of recommended 
intake could be used as components in country specific HDis. These are expected to be more 
sensitive to policy changes than life expectancy or adult literacy. 
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Every country should chose the HDI components that relate to its priorities. For example, CIS 
and Eastern European countries could choose the rate of employment to reflect the priorities 
arising from the economic transition they are undergoing. On the other hand, countries where 
food insecurity is a problem, such as many in Africa, could choose the daily caloric intake 
indicator as a component in the country specific HDI. Thus, the usefulness and versatility of 
the HDI as an analytical tool for HD at the national and sub-national levels would be 
enhanced if countries choose components that reflect their priorities and problems and are 
sensitive to their development levels, rather than rigidly using the three components 
presented in the HDI of the global HDRs. 
To be incorporated in the country specific HDI, the same methodology applied to the 
components of the global HDI could be applied to each of the selected indicators. For 
example, if the rate of employment is selected as a component in a national or a sub-national 
HDI, then its minimum and maximum values should be fixed for the country: say the 
maximum value would be 100% for full employment and the minimum value would be 0%. 
Then the rate of employment would be incorporated in the HDI as a value between O and 1. 
Since the minimum rate of employment is 0% and the maximum is 100%, the employment 
component for a country, region or group whose employment rate is 75% would be 0.75. The 
score for employment along with the scores of the other indicators incorporated in the 
country-specific HDI would be averaged in an overall index. 
Highlighting uneven development: comparing relative levels ofHDI and per capita income 
National wealth might expand people's choices. But it might not. The use that nations make 
of their wealth, not the wealth itself, is decisive. And unless societies recognise that their real 
wealth is their people, an excessive obsession with the creation of material wealth can 
obscure the ultimate objective of enriching human lives. 
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